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Article X of the Constitution, constitutional provisions, statutes,
and legal maxims are seen to have influenced the courts' final
,determinations. Among these competing rules, some must give
way since, by their very nature, not all can be applied. Defects
and gaps have resulted. The most serious one perhaps is the
inability of the legislature to levy a graduated or classified prop-
erty tax based upon reasonable and justifiable considerations.
The only remedy would appear to lie in a constitutional amend-
ment since there is little room to doubt that Section 3 has failed
to and can no longer accomplish this end and that Section 4 pre-
-vents such legislative action.
M. J. GARDE.t
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF INTERCEPTED
COMMUNICATIONS
At common law the admissibility of evidence is not affected by
the illegality of the means by which it is obtained.1 The illegality
is not condoned but ignored, because such a collateral issue can
mot be raised at the trial and because it in no way affects the
probative value of the evidence. 2 The remedy for invasion of the
immunity against illegal seizure of evidence is a suit for dam-
ages against the searching officer 3 or a prosecution for criminal
contempt.4
The right to personal security and privacy of the home as
t Member of the St. Louis Bar.
1. Jordan v. Lewis (K. B. 1740) 2 Stra. 1122, 93 Eng. Rep. 1072, 104
Eng. Rep. 618; Commonwealth v. Dana (Mass. 1841) 2 Mete. 329, 337;
Adams v. New York (1904) 192 U. S. 585; 5 Jones, Evidence (2d ed.
1926) 3865-83, sees. 2075-6, 2080. It appears that at least twenty-six states
:till follow the original common-law rule in its original vigor. Wigmore,
Evidence (2d ed. Supp. 1934) 920-950, secs. 2183-4 and notes. Arkansas
and Kansas are among these states. Knight v. State (1926) 171 Ark. 882,
286 S. W. 1013; State v. Johnson (1924) 116 Kan. 58, 226 Pac. 245.
2. Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure
(1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1. Fraenkel asserts that the theory of the first
ground is untenable. He points out that collateral inquiry has always been
allowed where a confession has been attacked as improperly obtained. The
,competency of witnesses is often the subject of collateral inquiry. The
objection may also be obviated by motion before trial for return or sup-
-pression of the illegally procured evidence. Weeks v. United States (1914)
232 U. S. 383.
3. Wilkes v. Wood (K. B. 1763) 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep.
489; Entick v. Carrington (K. B. 1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng.
'Rep. 807; Commonwealth v. Dana (Mass. 1841) 2 Mete. 329; and see Rhodes
v. Graham (1931) 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46.
4. See People v. Defore (1926) 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585; 4 Wig-
more, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 639, sec. 2184.
Washington University Open Scholarship
against governmental invasion is embodied in the unreasonable
search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment of the Con-
stitution ;5 the immunity from testimonial compulsion finds ex-
pression in the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth.6 After al-
most a century of silence as to their proper construction 7 the.
Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States8 declared that these
Amendments throw light on each other and mustbe read together
The Court there held that a statute compelling production of a
defendant's own papers for evidentiary purposes violated not
only the Fifth Amendment, but also the Fourth.9 This fusion of
the Amendments has been subjected to strong criticism,1° and-
indeed a unanimous opinion of the Court subsequently held that
evidence obtained by unlawful search was not incompetent for
that reason. 1 However in 1914 came the sweeping pronounce-
ment of the Weeks case that evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment may not under the Fifth be received against
the accused in a federal court, if he moves to suppress it before,
trial.12 This privilege finds its justification in being the only
practical sanction for the provisions of the former Amendment. 1n
5. It is generally stated that the Fourth Amendment was directed against.
the evils of the writs of assistance and general warrants, the use of which
was overthrown in England by Entick v. Carrington (K. B. 1765) 19 How.
St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807. See Howard, Admissibility of Evidence
Obtained by Wire Tapping (1928) 40 U. of Mo. Bull. L. Ser. 13.
6. Professor Corwin points out that by the ordinary use of language
the clause means no more than that nobody shall be compelled to give oral
testimony against himself in a criminal proceeding in which he is defendant.
This construction is corroborated by the use of the word "accused" in
similar clauses in contemporaneous state constitutions. Corwin, The Su-
preme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (1930) 29'
Mich. L. Rev. 1.
7. The self-incrimination clause was not used in this period because of
the congressional imposition on the federal courts of the common-law prac-
tice which excluded the accused from the witness stand. Corwin, The
Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (1930) 29'
Mich. L. Rev. 1.
8. (1886) 116 U. S. 616.
9. The entire Court agreed that the act in question was in contravention
of the Fifth Amendment; but the majority of seven, in what has been
called "obiter," also declared that seizure of documents of a defendant to&
be used in evidence against him is unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment and that such documents are protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination.
10. Professor Wigmore successfully demonstrates that such a construc-
tion is logically unjustifiable and that the two amendments should be
separately construed. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 867, sec. 2264.
See also opinion of Cardozo, J., in People v. Defore (1926) 242 N. Y. 13,
150 N. E. 585; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-In-
crimination Clause (1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 191.
11. Adams v. New York (1904) 192 U. S. 585.
12. Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 383.
13. 232 U. S. at 393. See also Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Ob-
tained through Unreasonable Search and Seizure (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev.
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.Subsequent cases apply the Fifth Amendment to all cases where
the Fourth is involved.14
Relying on this course of judicial legislation, the defendants
in Otntea4 v. United States," convicted of a conspiracy to vio-
late the National Prohibition Act by evidence obtained by wire
tapping, sought to have it excluded as violative of the Fourth
.and Fifth Amendments and of a state statute making wire tap-
ping a crime. Although protection of the Fourth Amendment
long ago had been extended to sealed matter in the mails,1 the
court by a five to four decision held that the Amendment did not
.apply because it enjoins search of only material things. The
Fifth Amendment was then held not to apply unless the Fourth
was first violated. The state statute was declared to have no
-effect on the rules of evidence in federal courts.17 The majority
held that the common-law doctrine required the admission of
-the evidence. While the grounds of the four dissents were vari-
ous,18 a common divergence from the majority's view as to the
Tublic policy of admitting the evidence was manifest.
Although the exception to the common-law rule of admissi-
'ility, based on constitutional grounds, has been confirmed by
-many federal cases 9 and has been adopted by many state courts, 0
11, 26-7; Ely, Federal Constitutional Limitations on Searches by State
Authority (1927) 12 ST. Louis LAW RVn- w 159. On the other hand
Traenkel contends that the federal doctrine as stated in the Weeks case
actually effects no restriction on unreasonable searches and seizures, but
that it seems to have an opposite result if the number of cases arising under
-the federal rule be a measure. Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law
-of Search and Seizure (1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1.
14. Gouled v. United States (1921) 255 U. S. 298; Agnello v. United
'States (1925) 269 U. S. 20; Olmstead v. United States (1928) 277 U. S.
-438.
15. (1928) 277 U. S. 438.
16. Ex parte Jackson (1877) 96 U. S. 727. The Jackson case was dis-
-tinguished by the majority on the grounds (1) that mailed matter is under
-the special monopolistic protection of the government; and (2) that such
matter is a tangible paper or effect within the meaning of the Amendment.
-Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent discounted this distinction. 277 U. S.
at 471. Rudkin, J., in his dissent below annihilated the distinction with
-forceful perspicuity. Olmstead v. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1927) 19 F.
(2d) 843, 850.
17. Mr. Chief Justice Taft pointed out (1) that the statute was not a
-rule of evidence; (2) that state statutes pertaining to admissibility of evi-
.dence passed after 1789 or after the state's admission to the union are
inapplicable in federal courts. United States v. Reid (1851) 53 U. S. 361.
18. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented both as to the constitutional and the
-state statutory questions. Mr. Justice Holmes held the evidence inadmis-
sible on the statutory ground. Mr. Justice Butler confined himself to the
-constitutional question. Mr. Justice Stone concurred in all dissents as to
-the merits of the question.
19. Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States (1920) 251 U. S. 385; Amos
-v. United States (1921) 255 U. S. 313; Agnello v. United States (1925)
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a trend toward confining the scope of the rule of exclusion has
been detected by some authorities.2 1 Thus, evidence obtained on
a warrantless search and seizure by a private person or by a
state or local officer is admissible if there is no collusion with a
federal officer. 22 So also, evidence uncovered by a warrantless
search and seizure on or after a lawful arrest 23 or with the ac-
cused's consent 2' is admissible in court. Upon showing of prob-
able cause, search and seizure are not illegal, and the evidence
uncovered is admissible.2 5 Evidence obtained by a warrantless
search and seizure of a third person's premises affords a de-
fendant no ground for complaint . 2  Indeed where the warrant-
less search and seizure are conducted anywhere but in the de-
fendant's home or office, he seems not to be protected against
the use of such evidence.2 ' Evidence obtained by a warrantless
search and seizure of contraband goods is not within the federal
exclusion rule.28 Frequently the courts have found that the de-
269 U. S. 20; Gambino v. United States (1927) 275 U. S. 310; United
States v. Lefkowit (1931) 285 U. S. 452.
20. Cases have been fully collected in 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.
1923) 627-631, sec. 2183, and in Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. Supp. 1934)
920-988, sec. 2183. Fraenkel points out that while only one state followed
the federal rule in 1920, eighteen states, including Missouri, Illinois, and
Oklahoma, had adopted it by 1928. Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the
Law of Search and Seizure (1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1, citing State v.
Rebasti (1924) 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858; People v. Castree (1924) 311
Ill. 392, 143 N. E. 112; Hess v. State (1921) 84 Okla. 73, 202 Pac. 310.
21. Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. Supp. 1934) 940-1, sec. 2184 a; Com-
ment (1936) 27 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 601; Comment (1937) 22 Corn.
L. Q. 585.
22. Burdeau v. McDowell (1921) 256 U. S. 465; Riggs v. United States
(C. C. A. 4, 1924) 299 Fed. 273; Note (1928) 14 SAINT Louis LAW RE-
vXUw 49.
28. Brady v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1924) 300 Fed. 540; Gaines v.
State (1924) 28 Okla. Cr. 353, 230 Pac. 946.
24. Mansolilli v. United States (C. C. A. 1, 1924) 2 F. (2d) 42; Coleman
v. Commonwealth (1927) 218 Ky. 841, 292 S. W. 771.
25. Siden v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1925) 9 F. (2d) 746; State v.
Rhodes (1927) 316 Mo. 571, 292 S. W. 78.
26. Cravens v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1933) 62 F. (2d) 261; Holmes
v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1938) 120 S. W. (2d) 595.
27. Hester v. United States (1924) 265 U. S. 57 (evidence seized in
open field owned by defendant); Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U. S.
132 (automobile on highway); Scher v. United States (1938) 6 U. S. L.
Week 420 (automobile in open garage); State v. Padgett (1926) 316 Mo.
179, 289 S. W. 954 (automobile); Ratzell v. State (1924) 27 Okla. Cr. 340,
228 Pac. 166 (wild ravine); but see Washington v. State (Okla. 1937) 64
P. (2d) 926, (1937) 22 Corn. L. Q. 585.
28. See authorities cited supra, note 21; and see Fenton v. United States
(D. C. Mont. 1920) 268 Fed. 221; Carroll v. United States (1925) 267
U. S. 132; Carvalho v. United States (C. C. A. 1, 1931) 54 F. (2d) 232.
There were present in the latter two of these cases other facts to take the
"we out of the federal rule. Cf. State v. Owens (1924) 302 Mo. 348, 259
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss2/14
260 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
fendant had waived the right to object to the use of evidence
obtained in violation of his constitutional guaranties.29 Olm-
stead v. Unitedt States ° has thus been explained as engrafting
another exception on the Supreme Court's rule of inadmissi-
bility.3 1
The Olmstead decision evoked wide criticism.32 However, the
Court suggested that Congress might by direct legislation make
such evidence inadmissible.3 3 Whether Congress had intended
such a departure from the common law of evidence in enacting
the Communications Act of 193434 was answered in the affirma-
S. W. 100, holding that contraband property unlawfully seized is prohibited
from use as evidence; Agnello v. United States (1925) 269 U. S. 20, ex-
cluding evidence of contraband narcotics illegally seized.
29. Winkle v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1923) 291 Fed. 493 (motion
for return of evidence on its proffer in court held too late); United States
v. Shules (C. C. A. 2, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 780 (waiver by giving bond);
People v. Kramer (1932) 260 Mich. 94, 244 N. W. 243 (the issue not triable
at trial if pre-trial motion denied); State v. King (Mo. 1932) 53 S. W.(2d) 252 (pre-trial motion for suppression omitted); Walker v. State
(1925) 31 Okla. 326, 239 Pac. 191 (untimely objection). However, it has
been held that no pre-trial motion for return of the illegally obtained evi-
dence is necessary when the facts are undisputed, are brought out by the
prosecution's evidence, or are unknown to defendant before trial. Amos v.
United States (1921) 255 U. S. 313; Poulos v. United States (C. C. A. 6,
1925) 8 F. (2d) 119; Agnello v. United States (1925) 269 U. S. 20.
30. (1928) 277 U. S. 438. '
31. Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure(1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1; Black, Ill Starred Prohibition Cases (1931)
82, c. 3; Comment (1936) 27 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 601. Federal cases
following the Olmstead case are: Kerns v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1931)
50 F. (2d) 602; Morton v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1932) 60 F. (2d)
697; Foley v. United States (C. C. A. 5, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 1; Bushhouse v.
United States (C. C. A. 6, 1933) 67 F. (2d) 843; Beard v. United States(App. D. C. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 837; Smith v. United States (App. D. C.
1937) 91 F. (2d) 556.
32. Black, Ill Starred Prohibition Cases (1931) 79-90, c. 3; Comment(1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 279; Editorial, St. Louis Post Dispatch,
Nov. 21, 1937, p. 2-I: 2; Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of
Search and Seizure (1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1; Howard, Admissibility of
Evidence Obtained by Wire Tapping (1928) 40 U. of Mo. Bull. L. Ser. 13.
33. Olmstead v. United States (1928) 277 U. S. 438, 465. Two federal
statutes of very limited application had dealt with the subject before the
passage of the Communications Act of 1934 (infra, notd 34): (1918) 40
Stat. 1017; (1933) 48 Stat. 1064, 1100, (1928) 47 U. S. C. A. sec. 501. See
Comment (1938) 4 Ohio St. U. L. J. 242. Many states have also passed
statutes making interception of telephone or telegraph messages a crime.
See, e. g., Ark. Pope's Dig. Stats. (1937) sec. 14255; I1. Smith-Hurd's
Ann. Stats. (1931) c. 134, secs. 15a, 16; Kan. Gen. Stats. Anno. (1935)
c. 17, see. 1908; Okla. Harow's Stats. (1931) see. 2356. Statutes of
twenty-six states are cited in Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v.
United States (1928) 277 U. S. 438, 466. Statutes of thirty-five states are
also there cited, which make it a criminal offense for a company engaged
in transmission of messages or for any of its agents to disclose their
contents.
34. (1934) 48 Stat. 1103, (1938 Supp.) 47 U. S. C. A. sec. 605.
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tive by the Court in the recent seven to two decision in Nardone
v. United States.15 The Act, the purpose of which was to regulate
interstate and foreign communications,3 forbade the interception
of any communication and the disclosure of its contents or mean-
ing.-" The Act was construed to embrace federal agents in its
prohibition and to alter the common law of evidence by preclud-
ing disclosure by testimony in court of intercepted interstate
communications. 8
The question yet unanswered by the Supreme Court is the
admissibility in federal courts of intrastate messages 9 inter-
cepted by federal agents. That question was represented first in
Vali v. United States.40 Not only was the applicability of the
Federal Communications Act 42 involved, but the effect of a state
statute making wire tapping a crime42 again had to be con-
35. (1937) 302 U. S. 379, rev'g United States v. Nardone (C. C. A. 2,
1987) 90 F. (2d) 630, which held the Olmstead decision binding.
36. (1934) 48 Stat. 1064, (1938 Supp.) 47 U. S. C. A. sec. 151. Com-
naittee reports emphasized the major purpose as the transfer of jurisdiction
over wire and radio communication to the new Federal Communications
Commission. Nardone v. United States (1937) 302 U. S. 382.
37. " * * * and no person not being authorized by the sender shall inter-
cept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to
any person." (1934) 48 Stat. 1103, (1938 Supp.) 47 U. S. C. A. sec. 605.
88. The dissent of Mr. Justice Sutherland demonstrates that such a con-
struction was not necessary. Section 605 of the Act also prohibits the dis-
closure of any interstate or foreign communication by the person trans-
mitting or receiving it except inter ali "on demand of other lawful
authority." Newfield v. Ryan (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 700, in con-
struing this exception to the prohibition, held that a federal agency, here
the Securities and Exchange Commission, could require by subpoena both
interstate and intrastate telegrams to be delivered by the telegraph com-
pany.
39. The nature of the communication intercepted is not likely to give
rise to any particular problem in state courts. Possessing plenary power
over its own court procedure, a state may in its discretion permit or prevent
the introduction in evidence of intercepted communications of any kind-
foreign, interstate, or intrastate. Presumably a state can make the act of
tapping any wire within its borders a crime, whether the wire be used to
convey foreign, interstate, or intrastate messages. See Olmstead v. United
States (1928) 277 U. S. 438, 470. In the only state case found presenting
the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained by wire tapping, the
interception was held not to be an illegal search and seizure within the
meaning of a state statute prohibiting the admission of evidence procured
by illegal search and seizure. Hitzelberger v. State (Md. 1938) 197 At].
604, citing with approval, Olmstead v. United States, supra, and dis-
tinguishing Nardone v. United States (1937) 302 U. S. 379. See also
Goode v. State (1930) 158 Miss. 616, 131 So. 106 (eavesdropping).
40. (C. C. A. 1, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 687. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, (1938) 303 U. S. 632, but the case was subsequently dismissed
on motion of counsel for petitioners. (1938) 304 U. S. 586.
41. (1934) 48 Stat. 1103 (1938 Supp.) 47 U. S. C. A. sec. 605.
42. Eavesdropping Act, Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 272, sec. 99.
1939] NOTES
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sidered. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held itself
bound by the Olmstead case as to the constitutionality of the
admission of the evidence, "until the Supreme Court shall re-
verse its decision on this point." The state statute was ruled
inapplicable on the grounds stated in the Olmstead case.43 The
dissenting judge differed on ethical considerations, holding that
the Nardone decision is broad enough on that basis to exclude
the evidence in the instant case.4
A contrary result has been reached by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Nardone case having held
the second clause of Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act to be a rule of evidence in federal courts, the Act was found
in Sablowsky v. United States 5 to embrace intrastate communi-
cations in its prohibitions against disclosure of intercepted com-
munications. The conclusion was based on the omission of any
qualifying phrase before "communications" in the pertinent
clause of Section 605 and justified by the rule of liberal construc-
tion of remedial statutes."5
A result similar to that in the Valli case has been reached in
three recent federal court rulings where no state statute was
involved.4 7 Another recent decision from the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals" assumes that evidence of intrastate telephone
communications obtained by wire tapping are admissible, but
43. Supra, note 17.
44. 94 F. (2d) at 694. The judge opines that the dissents in the Olin-
stead case are now the view of the Supreme Court.
45. (C. C. A. 3, 1938) 6 U. S. L. Week 488.
46. The first and third clauses of sec. 605 of the Act, which specifically
use the phrase "interstate or foreign communication," were distinguished
from the second clause. The former clauses involve regulation of the em-
ployees of the carrier in the lawful receipt of messages; the latter clause is
said to be a pure rule of evidence binding on federal courts. The former
clauses were thus enacted under the power of Congress over foreign and
interstate commerce; the latter clause was passed under constitutional pro-
visions endowing Congress with powers in respect to federal courts.
47. United States v. Reed (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 785; United
States v. Bianco (D. C. E. D. Mo. 1938) Bull. of Current Decisions issued
by Amer. T. & T. Co., No. 3883, holding that had Congress attempted to
make sec. 605 of the Communications Act apply to intrastate communica-
tions, the section would be invalid; United States v. Weiss (D. C. E. D.
N. Y. 1938) N. Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1938, p. 8:5, where the telephone con-
versations were presented by means of phonograph records. In United
States v. Reed, supra, the court held, however, that the admission of inter-
cepted interstate and intrastate messages was not shown to be reversible
error where other competent testimony was given to the same effect.
Counsel for the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
which was denied. (1938) 5 U. S. L. Week 126.
48. United States v. Bonanzi (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 570. The
Nardone Case came up from the Second Circuit.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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reverses the district court's conviction thereon on the ground
inter alia that the party offering the evidence failed to sustain
his burden of showing that the communication intercepted was
intrastate. However, evidence of local messages within the Dis-
trict of Columbia was held inadmissible,'4 9 the opinion relying
on the Congressional policy as found in the Nardone case, the
plenary power of Congress over the District of Columbia, and
the desirability of a uniform rule of procedure.
Several grounds might be advanced for the position that evi-
dence of intercepted intrastate communications should not be
admitted in federal courts. First, wire tapping might well be
held to be within the constitutional prohibitions of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments." While such a holding would involve a
direct overruling of the Olmstead decision,51 it would be in entire
consonance with judicial construction of the Amendments for
49. United States v. Plisco (D. C. D. C. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 242; see
Comment (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1109.
50. See the dissents by Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Butler in
Olmstead v. United States (1928) 277 U. S. 438, 471-485, 485-6; Mr. Justice
Roberts' opinion in Nardone v. United States (1937) 302 U. S. 379; Howard,
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Wire Tapping (1928) 40 U. of Mo.
Bull. L. Ser. 13; Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and
Seizure (1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1.
51. (1928) 277 U. S. 438. Professor Wigmore laments that all of the
opinions in the Olmistead case ignored the fundamental practical question.
He suggests that wire tapping need be neither constitutional nor unconsti-
tutional per se, and proposes a middle ground. Since only unreasonable
searches and seizures are prohibited by the Constitution, he suggests a
species of administrative restraint be imposed on wire-tapping and inter-
ception of the mails, corresponding to warrants in other cases of search
and seizure. Wigmore, Telephone Wire-Taliping as a Violation of the
Fourth Amendment (1928) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 377. Black concurs in the sug-
gestion in his Ill Starred Prohibition Cases (1931) 80-1. As a matter of
fact it appears that such administrative regulations have been adopted and
followed by the Department of Justice. New York Times, Dec. 23, 1937,
p. 16: 6. Professor Wigmore is thus consistent in ignoring the interde-
pendence of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in their construction by the
Supreme Court. However Mr. Justice Brandeis clearly states that the use
as evidence in a criminal proceeding of facts ascertained by wire tapping
must be deemed a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover although
Professor Wigmore has refused to recognize the rule, it is apparently set-
tled by decisions of the Supreme Court that a search with or without a
warrant solely for the purpose of procuring evidence and not to seize prop-
erty which the government has a right to take or which is unlawfully or
wrongfully possessed by the individual is unreasonable. Gouled v. United
States (1921) 255 U. S. 298; United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 285 U. S.
452. Since wire-tapping, whether supervised or not, could have no other
purpose than the procurement of evidence, it is submitted that if a search
and seizure at all, wire-tapping must be unreasonable and therefore viola-
tive of the Fourth Amendment. Such an illegal interference with the in-
dividual's privacy is within the purpose and intent of the prohibitory
clauses of the Amendment, if not within its literal purview.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss2/14
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over half a century. 2 Further, the reason for excluding evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution might be extended to
require exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of a statute,
whether state or federal. 8
Another basis for the imposition of the judicial bar may be
discovered in the Federal Communications Act of 1934.54 Where-
as Section 605 provides that interstate and foreign messages law-
fully known to employees of the communication agency may be
disclosed "on demand of lawful authority,"' 5 it forbids divul-
gence of "any" intercepted communications.", Inasmuch as wires
of communication and air waves are instrumentalities used in
interstate commerce, it may be believed that all messages,
whether interstate, intrastate, or foreign, are under the juris-
diction of the Federal Communications Commission while being
transmitted over the wires or waves.5' Whether or not that is
so, the reasoning of the Nardone decision,"' which construes the
pertinent clause of Section 605 to be a pure rule of evidence, ap-
plies with equal strength to intercepted intrastate and interstate
messages.59
52. Ex parte Jackson (1877) 96 U. S. 727; Boyd v. United States (1886)
116 U. S. 616; Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) 142 U. S. 547; Gouled v.
United States (1921) 25 U. S. 298; Gambino v. United States (1927) 275
U. S. 310.
53. Expressions of this view may be found in Mr. Justice Brandeis' and
Mr. Justice Holmes' dissents in Olmstead v. United States (1928) 277
U. S. 438, 471, 469; J. Morton's dissent in Valli v. United States (C. C.
A. 1, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 694; J. Cox's opinion in United States v. Plisco(D. C. D. C. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 242; Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the
Law of Search and Seizure (1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1.
54. (1934) 48 Stat. 1103, (1938 Supp.) 47 U. S. C. A. sec. 605. See
Sablowsky v. United States (U. S. 1938) 6 U. S. L. Week 488.
55. First and third clauses.
56. Second and fourth clauses. Would not "any" include intrastate as
well as interstate and foreign messages? Plausible reasons can be thought
of for this difference in the provisions touching intercepted communications
and those affecting messages in the lawful possession of employees.
57. See persuasive language in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States (1935) 295 U. S. 495, 544; National Labor Relations Board
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) 301 U. S. 1, 36. Otherwise tele-
phone and telegraph lines and air waves would at one instant be under
the supervision of the federal agency and at the next instant under the
control of the state.
58. (1937) 302 U. S. 379. There is nothing said in the opinion in this
case in favor of a different definition of the scope of the provisions relat-ing to intercepted communications. The suggested view is more in accord
with the declared purpose and intent of the framers of the act than is a
narrower construction. (1934) 48 Stat. 1064, (1938 Supp.) 47 U. S. C. A.
sec. 151.
59. Congress possesses power to provide that federal officers may not
divulge intercepted intrastate communications in the federal courts. U. S.
Const. Art. III, Sec. 1; Sablowsky v. United States (C. C. A. 3, 1938) 6
U. S. L. Week 488.
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Finally, the evidence might be excluded on considerations of
ethics and social policy.,6 Indeed the authorities seem agreed
that the question must be ultimately settled on grounds of policy. 61
Proponents of admissibility of the evidence point to the public
interest in the detection and conviction of criminals.62. Opponents
assert that a paramount public interest arises from a knowledge
that law enforcement is effected through agencies which must
and do respect the law and the privacy and personal security of
the individual citizen.6s It is well known that public sentiment
was hostile to many methods adopted by such agencies during
the era of national prohibition." In view of the previous judicial
60. See the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice
Holmes in Burdeau v. McDowell (1921) 256 U. S. 465, 477; the dissents
of the same justices in Olmstead v. United States (1928) 277 U. S. 438,
471, 469; Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion in Nardone v. United States (1937)
302 U. S. 379; Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and
Seizure (1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 1. Judicial expressions may be found
designating the practice of using wire-tapping evidence as "dirty business,"
as "means which shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play,"
and as "coming into court with unclean hands." A suggested analogy is
the doctrine of entrapment, the bases for which are reconsidered and dis-
cussed in the opinions of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Roberts
in Sorrells v. State (1932) 287 U. S. 435, 453. Howard, Admissibility of
Evidence Obtained by Wire Tapping (1928) 40 U. of Mo. Bull. L. Ser. 13.
61. Mr. Justice Roberts in Nardone v. United States (1937) 302 U. S.
379; Ely, Federal Limitations on Searches by State Authority (1927) 12
ST. Louis LAw Rsvzmw 159; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction
of the Self-Incrimination Clause (1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1.
62. See, for instance, Mr. Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Olmstead v.
United States (1928) 277 U. S. 438; Mr. Justice Sutherland's dissent in
Nardone v. United States (1937) 302 U. S. 379; United States v. One Ford
V-8 Sedan (W. D. Mich. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 705; Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (1930) 29 Mich. L.
Rev. 1; Broadhurst, Use of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure
(1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 191; Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. Supp. 1934) 950, see.
2184b. It has been suggested that "listening in" on telephone conversations
may still be permissible under the Nardone Case. New York Times, Dec.
21, 1937, p. 1: 1. The Nardone decision would not then greatly hinder
agencies of law enforcement if evidence uncovered by means of and through
the use of inadmissible intercepted information is admitted. A suggested
analogy is the admission of facts discovered on the basis of an inadmissible
confession. 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 859; Comment (1938)
86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 436. It is submitted that such a practice is not less a
violation of the Fourth Amendment and is not less unethical than the use
of wire-tapping evidence itself.
63. Supra, note 60.
64. Black, Ill Starred Prohibition Cases (1931) 9, 15, 79; Editorial, St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 21, 1937, p. 2-C: 2. Professor Wigmore points
out that the federal doctrine of exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was
largely based on cases involving violation of the Eighteenth Amendment.
By way of wishful thinking, he adds that since the repeal of that amend-
ment the orthodox rule of absolute admissibility will probably once more
make its appearance. Wignore, Evidence (2d ed. Supp. 1934) 941, sec.
2184a.
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declarations and alignments of the present personnel of the
Court,6 5 it may well be that ethical considerations and the policy
against allowing contamination of the judicial process will weigh
heavily with the Court should the question of the admissibility
of intercepted intrastate messages be presented for its decision.
FRANK R. KENNEDY.
65. It is significant that-the five justices who participated in both the
Olmstead and, Nardone eases maintained the same attitude toward the ad-
mission of the evidence obtained from the tapped wires. It is therefore
more than likely that the Nardone case was a decision, at least as to thosejustices, on the merits of the controversy rather than merely a construction
of the federal statute involved. See Comment (1938) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
436. It is possible that Mr. Justice Reed might disqualify himself for con-
sideration of this subject, having been of counsel as Solicitor General in
the Nardone ease. (1938) 5 U. S. Law Week 404. There was some com-
ment that Mr. Justice Black, who as head of the Senate Lobby Committee
insisted that private telegraph messages should be copied, voted in the
Nardone Case that the statutory provision against revelation of telephone
messages extends even to federal agents. N. Y. Times, De. 21, 1937, p. 1: 1.
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